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A random search optimization method based off an analogous process for the 
slow cooling of metals is explored and used to find the optimum solution for a number of 
regression models that analyze nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical terrorism 
targets. A non-parametric simulation based off of historical data is also explored. 
Simulated series of 30 years and a 30 year extrapolation of historical data are provided. 
The inclusion of independent variables used in the regression analysis is based off 
existing work in the reviewed literature. CBRN terrorism data is collected from both the 
Monterey Institute's Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Database as well as from 
the START Global Terrorism Database. Building similar models to those found in the 
literature and running them against CBRN terrorism incidence data determines if 
conventional terrorism indicator variables are also significant predictors of CBRN 
terrorism targets. The negative binomial model was determined to be the best regression 
model available for the data analysis. Two general types of models are developed, 
including an economic development model and a political risk model. From the economic 
development model we find that national GDP, GDP per capita, trade openness, and 
democracy to significant indicators of CBRN terrorism targets. Additionally from the 
political risk model we find corrupt, stable, and democratic regimes more likely to 
experience a CBRN event. We do not find language/religious fractionalization to be a 
significant predictive variable. Similarly we do not find ethnic tensions, involvement in 








Introduction to CBRN Terrorism 
 Over the past 30 years, the use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 
Nuclear (CBRN) weapons by sub-state actors has become a major/significant concern in 
many nations around the globe.  A brief review of the open-source literature on CBRN 
terrorism by the National Defense University’s Center for Counterproliferation Research 
suggests that CBRN incidence may be on the rise due to the increased availability of 
materials throughout the world (National Defense University 2002). The public has 
become largely desensitized to traditional terrorism attacks, and previous attack methods 
may not be seen as an effective way for terrorist organizations to achieve their goals. The 
shock value and fear-inducing properties of CBRN weapons can provide a means for 
terrorist organizations to revitalize the effectiveness of their efforts (National Defense 
University 2002). The devastating capability of these weapons motivates research to 
understand their acquisition and deployment.  
 Research in the areas of network theory, psychology, econometrics, and many 
other fields, are commonly applied to further the understanding of the dynamics of 
terrorism. Econometric analysis of terrorist motivation, targets, and incident locations is a 
particularly active area of research. Yet while traditional terrorism is actively examined 
in an econometric framework, little work has been done with a focus on CBRN terrorism. 
Are leading indicators of conventional terrorism also significant predicators of CBRN 
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terrorism targets and can a future series of CBRN incidence data be simulated with 
similar statistical properties to the historical data? These are the main questions to be 
investigated. 
We use the U.S. Department of Defense’s definition of terrorism to classify 
attacks as acts of terrorism. The U.S. Department of Defense defines terrorism as “The 
calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; 
intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that 
are generally political, religious, or ideological (Hoffman 2006).” 
CBRN terrorism is often associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 
however a CBRN terrorism incident does not require the attack to inflict mass casualties, 
nor does it require lethality from an attack at all. If a CBRN agent is sought after, 
acquired, or used, it is classified as a CBRN incident in this study.  
Research on CBRN terrorism is limited due to the general lack of available data on 
CBRN terrorism. Few databases compile data on CBRN incidents and those that do have 
relatively few accounts of CBRN terrorism compared with conventional terrorism.  
One prominent resource available for data on CBRN incidents is the regularly 
updated Monterey Institute’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Database (Monterey Institute 
of International Studies 2010). It is comprised of more than 1100 events dating back to 
1900 relating to the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.  
Events are classified by type, including politically, ideologically, and criminally 
motivated incidents. An advanced search feature also allows the user to locate incidents 




 An alternative database exists and is known as the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
2010). It is provided by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism and includes more than 87,000 events from 1970 through 2008. 
Unlike the Monterey Database, it is comprised of both conventional and CBRN terrorism 
events. The GTD database can be used and compared with results from the Monterey 
database to determine if the results are database dependent. 
In order to determine if the same factors that affect conventional terrorism also 
influence CBRN terrorism a regression analysis is employed. This will determine the 
relative impact of each variable in predicting counts of CBRN incidents. In order to run a 
regression model a dataset must first be constructed, and is done so from a variety of 
sources. We collect data on variables that have proven to be significant in regards to 
conventional terrorism. Based off of previous work, hypotheses are developed for the 
independent variables and their possible relation to CBRN incidence. 
Two major regression models are constructed, the first is an economic 
development model based off of work by Blomberg & Hess (2005) and the second is a 
political risk model based off of work by Ivanova & Sandler (2007). The economic 
development includes variables such as national and per capita GDP and trade openness. 
The political risk model looks at corruption, rule of law, religious and military 
involvement in government and government stability as well as additional variables. The 
economic development model is run as both a cross sectional regression with values 
averaged over the 30 year period, and as a panel regression with independent 
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observations recorded for each country-year. The political risk model is run as panel 
regression as well. 
 With the datasets constructed a series of regressions are performed to provide 
coefficients for each socio-economic variable, stating its individual contribution to the 
prediction of CBRN incidents. The regression models are broken down into subsets of 
variables based on the previous regression analyses described above. Significance levels 
for each variable are reported indicating if a variable is contributing to the predictive 
value of the model. From the regression coefficients each of our previously developed 
hypotheses are assessed.  
Following the regression analysis, generation of new data via simulated annealing 
is explored. Generating new data series can provide data on expected count frequencies in 
the future. This approach assumes the underlying properties involved in generating 
historical data continues unchanged in the future.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. A review of the literature on 
econometric terrorism studies follows in chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes regression models 
and simulated annealing optimization. Chapter 4 provides a data summary for both 
dependent datasets as well as for all independent variables included.  Regression results 
are presented in chapter 5. Simulated annealing results follow in chapter 6. A discussion 











Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) surveyed recent work on empirical investigations 
on the causes and targets of terrorism.  They found that large populous countries were 
likely targets of transnational terrorism.  In addition to population they generalized that 
social stress and weak institutions attract terrorism. They found that target countries of 
terrorism are chosen based on economic success.  They dismiss popular hypotheses that 
democracy, education, and religion are predictive of terrorism venues. Overall they found 
the most important determinants of terrorism to be politically and demographically 
founded. 
 Klitgaard et. al. (2005), used data on economic and political freedom and tested 
the impact of these variables on the occurrence of transnational terrorist events.  Data on 
terrorism was sourced from both the ITERATE dataset (Mickolus 1982) and the U.S. 
State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism report for years spanning 1996-2002 
(US-State-Department 2004). Independent variables include a wide range of political and 
economic freedom indicators gathered from a variety of sources including the Economic 
Freedom of the World Index (James D. Gwartney 2004), Penn World Tables (Heston, 
Alan et al. 2002), World Development Indicators (The World Bank 2010), Freedom 
House Index, and Polity-IV dataset (Marshall, G. et al. 2000). A binomial logistic 
regression was performed using a dichotomous dependent variable.  Although economic 
freedom indicators had relatively little explanatory value for predicting terrorism, greater 
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per capita income was associated with higher probabilities of terrorism, whereas more 
trade was associated with decreased probability of terrorism. A non-linear relationship 
between political freedom and terrorism was discovered.  A small increase in democracy 
from none at all was found to increase terrorism, however further increasing democracy 
led to a decrease in terrorism.  
Alberto Abadie (2006) focused on factors explaining international terrorism.  
Data was used from the World Market Research Center’s Global Terrorism Index which 
is a comprehensive index of 186 countries and their potential risk for terrorism events 
(World Market Research Center 2004).   Combining this index with a set of independent 
economic and political data from the World Bank (The World Bank 2010) and Freedom 
House Political Index (Freedom House Inc. 1973-2009), an ordinary least squares 
regression analysis was performed for the year 2003-2004. Abadie’s (2006) results were 
similar to those found by Klitgaard et. al. (2005).Economic indicators do not provide 
conclusive predictive results for terrorism incidents. Political freedom is found to be a 
significant predictor and exhibits a similar non-linear relationship. Terrorism is expected 
to rise during transitions from autocracies to democracies.  
 James Piazza (2006) examined conventional terrorism incidents and their 
casualties spanning the years 1986-2002. Data on terrorist incidents in 96 countries 
worldwide was used from the annual U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global 
Terrorism reports (US-State-Department 2004).   
  Employing an ordinary least squares regression, he determined whether poverty, 
inequality, and poor economic development are root causes of terrorism.  Consistent with 
the earlier studies, Piazza found that the economic indicators have little predictive value 
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for terrorist incidents and casualties.  He finds democratic and political variables to have 
some predictive value for either incidents or casualties. The only variable that was a 
significant predictor for both terrorism incidents and casualties was population. More 
populous, socially diverse states attract more terrorism than their smaller ethnically and 
religiously homogenous counterparts.  Populous states with multiparty political systems 
are more prone to terrorism than less populous states with up to three political parties 
(Piazza 2006). 
 Ivanova and Sandler (2007) used data on CBRN terrorism rather than traditional 
terrorism.  The Monterey Institute’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Database is 
the source of CBRN incidence counts for the years 1988-2004. An odds ratio 
methodology was employed to determine if there was any association or correlation 
between variables of interest.  The odds ratio test of democracy showed a strong and clear 
association with increased CBRN terrorism. A strong and significant correlation between 
CBRN terrorism and rule of law was also found.  The honesty of a state, measured by a 
lack of corruption attracts CBRN terrorism, but the association is not as strong as with 
democracy and rule of law.  In addition to the odds ratio tests, Ivanova and Sandler also 
estimated a negative binomial regression model. This confirmed the odds ratio findings 
for democracy and rule of law, yet found the opposite influence of honesty on CBRN 
terrorism. The regression coefficient for honesty was negative suggesting honest regimes 
are less likely to experience CBRN terrorism than dishonest regimes. Analysis from odds 
ratio testing and regression models suggest that wealthy, democratic states with a strong 
rule of law will tend to attract CBRN terrorism (Ivanova and Sandler 2007). 
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Krueger and Laitin (Krueger, Laitin et al. 2008) analyzed the origins and targets 
of terrorism by estimating a negative binomial regression analysis on the data.   Terrorism 
incident data was used from the U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 
reports for years spanning from 1981-2002 (US-State-Department 2004). Results from 
the analysis showed that political oppression was a major factor in the country of origin 
of the attack perpetrator. Poverty did not have strong relationship to the origins of terror. 
Countries with high levels of economic achievement were shown to be the primary 
victims of terrorist attacks (Krueger, Laitin et al. 2008). 
Jose Tavares (2004) used ordinary linear regression analysis to examine a cross-
country dataset covering years from 1987 to 2001. Dependent terrorism data was 
obtained from the dataset of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism 
(International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism 2003). Independent variables used in 
the study included various economic and political freedom indicators. Additional controls 
such as population, illiteracy rate, ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity were also 
included. It was seen that higher income per capita is associated with increased rates of 
terrorism. Democracy and political development do not increase vulnerability to terrorist 
attacks. Similarly trade openness was not associated with increased terrorist attacks.  
Linguistic diversity was shown to be significant and positively correlated with terrorism 
incidence. Ethnic and religious diversity displayed the opposite effect and were correlated 
with reduced terrorism incidence. Finally, a larger share of population living in urban 




 Li and Schaub (2004)used negative binomial regression techniques to analyze 
terrorism data from the ITERATE dataset (Mickolus 1982).  They used data on 112 
countries for the years spanning 1975-1997.  A variety of economic indicators such as 
trade, foreign direct investment and economic development and political indicators such 
as democracy, government capability, and country size were included. Contrary to the 
initial hypothesis, they found that increased trade and foreign direct investment did not 
significantly increase terrorism. GDP per capita was shown to be significant and 
inversely related to terrorism where as controls of size, government capacity and 
democracy were all shown to be significant and positive contributors to increased 
terrorism incidence (Li and Schaub 2004). 
Eubank and Weinberg (2001) used data on terrorist events from the ITERATE 
dataset (Mickolus 1982) and found that most terrorist events occurred in stable 
democracies with perpetrators of the attack also emanating from stable democracies. 
Quan Li (2005) also sought to examine the role of democracy on transnational 
terrorism. Using negative binomial regression analysis he looked at terrorism data from 
the ITERATE dataset (Mickolus 1982) on 119 countries from 1975 to 1997. Agreeing 
with his initial hypothesis, he finds that democratic participation reduces the incidence of 
transnational terrorism. He also finds that institutional constraints attract terrorism. From 
the inclusion of control variables he found economic development as measured by GDP 
per capita to be associated with reduced terrorism.  Nations undergoing regime changes 
were found to be more susceptible to terrorism. Large countries with highly capable and 
stable regimes were found to attract terrorism.  
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Drakos and Gofas (2006) used negative binomial and zero-inflated negative binomial 
regression analysis on the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(MIPT)Terrorism Knowledge Base (MIPT-RAND 2004). Data on 153 countries during 
the period 1985-1998 was analyzed. Independent variables in their study included 
economic indicators such as trade openness, GDP growth rate, and life expectancy and 
other variables such as polity index, population density, education, and interstate conflict.   
It was seen that previous (local) terrorist events were correlated with increased terrorism 
rates. Interstate conflict was shown to increase levels of terrorism. Trade openness was 
shown to have a negative overall effect on terrorism. A key finding from the study is the 
relation of democracy to increased terrorism activity. The only variable found to be 
significant in the zero-inflation model for the prediction of zero counts of terrorism was 
polity. Increased polity is found to significantly reduce the odds of observing a zero 
count. This leads to the prediction that democracy does not have a large impact on 
terrorism, rather non-democratic states tend to underreport acts of terrorism and thus 
appear to have fewer terrorist incidents (Drakos and Gofas 2006). 
Bravo and Dias (2006) use data from the MIPT database (MIPT-RAND 2004)for the 
years 1997-2004. They focused specifically at deprivation and geopolitical factors of 
terrorism and utilized an ordinary least squares approach. Their main findings were that 
terrorism was associated with reduced levels of development, literacy rate, and ethnic 
fractionalization.  Levels of mineral reserves, non-democratic regimes, and participation 
in international organizations were negatively associated to incidents of terrorism. 
Dreher and Fischer (2010) looked at the role of government decentralization on 
terrorism incidence. They utilized a negative binomial regression on 109 countries with 
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data from the MIPT Database (MIPT-RAND 2004) for the years 1976-2000. They find 
that fiscal decentralization, which is spending across all levels of government, shows a 
reduction in transnational terrorism. They also found that political decentralization, which 
represents decision making across all levels of government, is not related to transnational 
terrorism incidence. Population was found to be strongly correlated with increased 
transnational terrorism and GDP per capita was not shown to be significant. When social 
fractionalization measures were added, they did not show significance. 
Dreher and Gassebner (2008) sought to find out if political proximity to the United 
States was subject to increased terrorist attacks from abroad. They analyzed 116 countries 
from the MIPT Terrorism Database from 1975-2001 (MIPT-RAND 2004) using a 
negative binomial regression analysis. They hypothesized that nations voting in 
agreement with the United States in the United Nations General Assembly were more 
prone to transnational terrorism. Their results confirmed their hypothesis. They also 
included a number of control variables similar to those used by Piazza (2006).  They find 
that greater government fractionalization is associated with increased terrorism.  They did 
not find GDP per capita to have any influence on transnational terrorism incidence.  
Population was found to be significant and positively related to transnational terrorism. In 
addition they found that the level of political freedom in a country did not influence 
terrorism incidence, but rather increasing political freedom was associated with decreased 
terrorism incidence. It is a transition of political freedom that matters.  
 Blomberg and Hess (2005) analyzed the economic determinants of transnational 
terrorism. Data on transnational terrorism was taken from the ITERATE dataset 
(Mickolus 1982), which includes data on 179 countries from 1968-2003. A censored 
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linear regression approach was used to conduct the regression analysis. Various subsets 
of economic indicators were also used and various groupings of dependent variable data 
were broken down by relative national income level. Their results showed that economic 
development in high income countries was associated with a high number of 
transnational terrorism incidents. Economic development in low income countries had the 









Simulated Annealing Optimization 
Simulated annealing is a numerical optimization technique based off of an 
analogous process for the slow cooling of metals. It has the ability to locate a global 
minimum in the presence of many possible local minima. It is essentially a random walk 
through a defined parameter space. As with annealing in metals, it involves a slow 
cooling of a system in order to find its minimum energy. When metals are heated and 
slowly cooled defects can be removed and atoms find their way to lower energy states, 
reducing the overall energy of the system. The same process is done numerically with a 
defined energy function, with a slow cooling mechanism allowing the algorithm to 
escape local minima in its search for the global function minimum. 
 
The Simulated Annealing Algorithm 
 
  In order to begin with simulated annealing, one must first define a score function 
for the problem at hand. The goal of simulated annealing is to find the global minimum 
of this defined score function. First the algorithm starts with an initial state, with score of 
this position is calculated via the previously mentioned score function. The first 
computed score becomes the current minimum score of the function.  
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A new point in the search space is determined via a Markov chain and once again 
evaluated. If this score is less than the currently determined minimum, the new score is 
set to be the new minimum and the current position is set as the solution point. At this 
point we see simulated annealing accepting only moves that reduce the current score of 
the problem. However, if a move is suggested that increases the score of the function, it 
may be accepted according to what is known as the metropolis criterion, developed by 
Metropolis (1953). The probability of accepting a move that increases the energy of the 
system is given by equation 1. 
 (1) 
Where represents the change in energy of the proposed move,  is the 
Boltzmann constant, and T is the current temperature of the system. From the metropolis 
criterion we can see that large changes in energy change are accompanied by a smaller 
probability of acceptance. Similarly, as the temperature of the system is reduced the 
probability of metropolis acceptance is reduced. This probability of accepting 
energetically unfavorable moves is what allows the algorithm to escape local minima in 
hopes of finding the global minimum. 
The simulated annealing algorithm proceeds by reducing the temperature of the 
system after a designated number of steps at the current temperature. As the temperature 
is reduced, the algorithm should hopefully approach the solution. When the final 
specified temperature is reached, the current state of the system is reported. 
In this implementation of the algorithm, the GNU Scientific Library for C is 
utilized. This library contains a number of methods necessary for simulated annealing 
(Galassi and Theiler 2011). The most important function is the simulated annealing solve 
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function which calls all other functions to perform the optimization. It takes a number of 
parameters including the initial parameter specification, the energy of the system, a step 
function, and a distance function. It also requires additional parameters specifying the 
number of iterations, Boltzmann constant, maximum step size, temperature dampening 
factor, initial and final temperature values. 
Next, the functions being called by the solve function must be specified. Starting 
with the energy function, also known as a score function, we must define the function to 
be minimized. Of course this varies depending on the problem. In the parametric 
regression modeling traditional estimators are used as the score functions. For the linear 
model a sum of square residuals is used while Poisson and negative binomial models use 
their respective log-likelihood functions. For the non-parametric simulations a moments 
based objective function is minimized.  
A step function must be specified as a method of moving to the next candidate in 
the function space. In the parametric based regression implementation we choose a step 
length defined in the input parameters and individually step each member of the current 
point vector. If a current point in space is represented by , with  
representing the current iteration, then the step function will adjust each point  
according to equation 2. 
,  (2) 
represents a random number on the interval . 
A large step size allows the method to generate points that are further apart in the 
function space. The non-parametric stepping function is similar, except modified so only 
integer steps are made. 
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 The simulated annealing solve function will now call each of the aforementioned 
functions until the final temperature is reached. A log function provides the current 
iteration, point, temperature, energy, and best energy found during the annealing process. 
 
Application to Regression Methods 
 Regression methods involve fitting some parameterized function to an observed 
response. The most basic regression model is that of a linear model. Typically referred to 
as ordinary least squares (OLS), it involves fitting a function a function of the form given 
in equation 3. 
 (3)   
Where Y is the response variable,  is a vector of observed independent data, 
is a vector of parameters to be determined, and  is the error term. In order to find the 
parameters that best fit this model, the error must be minimized over all observations N. 
In this case typically the square of the error term is minimized to penalize larger errors 
more severely. As described above the error term to be minimized is given in equation 4. 
.  (4) 
The score function to be minimized has been determined and now simulated 
annealing algorithm can be applied to search the parameter spaced defined by . The 
vector of parameters that minimizes the squared error function provides the optimal 
solution for the regression model. In order to test the functionality of the simulated 
annealing code, a number of linear regression examples pulled from Gujarati (2003) were 
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duplicated and confirmed that the simulated annealing code was able to find the proper 
solutions. 
Applying simulated annealing to a linear model was the first step, however CBRN 
incidences are reported as count variables and can only exist in the positive domain. For 
this reason, more appropriate regression models are available.  
A Poisson regression is commonly used to model count data. The Poisson 
probability distribution is given by equation 5. 
 (5) 
Where  is the observed number of events (in this case terrorist incidents),  is 
the expected number of events occurring during the given time interval.  is 
parameterized by a log linear model according to equation 6. 
 (6) 
 is a vector of independent variable data and  is a vector of predictive coefficients 
to be measured. 
 In order to apply simulated annealing to a Poisson regression, a score function has 
to be determined. A way to assess the fit of data to a Poisson model is by looking at the 
likelihood function. If the probability of observing count given independent data  is 
given by equation 5, then the probability of observing all counts given the independent 
data, also known as the likelihood, is given by the product of the individual probability 
density functions. This yields probability of observing the observed outcomes given the 
set of parameters and independent data. The likelihood function for a Poisson model is 




It is often easier to find the maximum of this function if the natural logarithm is taken, 
yielding the log-likelihood function in equation 8. 
 (8) 
In order to maximize this function, its negative is used as the score function. 
Minimizing this function over all observations in the dataset will yield the best possible 
parameter estimates for . 
One assumption made by the Poisson regression is equality between the mean and 
variance. 
 (9) 
Since the data being worked with is over dispersed with a variance larger than the 
mean, a more appropriate regression model is available. The negative binomial regression 
is often used for count data that exhibits high over dispersion.  The negative binomial 
model is a modification of the Poisson model with the introduction of an over dispersion 
parameter α.  This gives the model the ability to more appropriately handle over 
dispersion of the data. The expected value  remains the same as in the Poisson model, 
however the variance is now given by the following relationship. 
 (10) 
Note that as α becomes increasingly small, the variance will approach the 
expected value and the negative binomial distribution will converge to the Poisson 
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distribution. In order to determine the likelihood function we start with the probability 
distribution function given below. 
 (11) 
The link function for the negative binomial model remains the same as in the Poisson.  




Taking the log we arrive at the log-likelihood function for the negative binomial 
regression 
 (13) 
Minimizing this function with the simulated annealing algorithm should find the 




In addition to minimizing negative log likelihood functions for linear, Poisson, 
and negative binomial models simulated annealing can be used for non-parametric fitting. 
Lokupitiya and Borgman (2005) used simulated annealing to simulated hurricane and 
storm incident data. Using a similar methodology, CBRN series of incident counts are 
generated using simulated annealing. 
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Given a historical series of counts, provided by the START Global Terrorism 
Database, a simulated series of equal length is created while retaining key statistical 
properties of the original series. These statistical properties include the mean, semi-
variogram, skewness, and kurtosis. Additionally, series of double length and series 
extrapolated from the historical data are also generated. 
The semi-variogram is included to maintain the correlation structure and 
distributional dependence of the original series. The semi-variogram is given by the 
following estimator provided by Cressie (1993). 
 (14) 
Where  is the number of distinct 
pairs for lag . 
The mean, skewness, and kurtosis are measures of the first, third, and fourth 
moments respectively. Combining these properties together a score function for the 
simulated annealing algorithm is formed. 
   (15) 
 is the semi-variogram of a configuration, H represents historical data, and S 
represents simulated data.  
Simulated annealing proceeds as before in the parametric fitting examples. We 
first initialize a configuration with the same mean as the historical data being compared. 
After each iteration, two points of the configuration are incremented by a step of 1. One 
position is increased while the other is decreased. As before, an initial and final 
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Data on CBRN incidents is collected from two databases including the Monterey 
Institute’s WMD Terrorism Database (Monterey Institute of International Studies 2010) 
and START’S Global Terrorism Database. The Monterey Database is comprised entirely 
of CBRN incidents while the START database tracks CBRN and conventional incidents.  
Events from the Monterey Database and START GTD are counted if they were 
politically or ideologically motivated. Incidents are also classified by event type. 
Additionally we are interested in removing false cases / hoaxes from the dataset. 
Therefore we include only those incidents involving an acquisition, attempted 
acquisition, possession, or threat with possession of a CBRN weapon. Events dating back 
to 1968 are catalogued, yet due to the majority of events occurring recently, we collect 
data for the years spanning 1980-2009.  
The START database includes information on more than 98,000 terrorist attacks 
dating back to 1970. In order to compare regression results we use the same yearly span 
as before, 1980-2009. While this database includes both conventional and CBRN 





Economic Development Model 
For the economic development model we collected data on a total of 208 
countries, not all of which have complete data available, resulting in a max number of 
observations of 178.  The World Bank provides data on three key independent variables 
including measures of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), trade openness, and literacy rate 
(The World Bank 2010). Gross domestic product was averaged for the years 1980-2009 
and given in terms of constant 2005 purchasing power parity. A per capita measure is 
also included. Trade openness is measured by the ratio of imports and exports to GDP. 
Values were also averaged over the thirty year period. Literacy rate is measured for the 
adult population, those over the age of 15. 
Data on linguistic and religious fractionalization is provided by Alesina et al 
(2003). The method for determining indices of fractionalization is given in equation 16. 
 (16) 
where sij represents the share of group i (up to N groups) in county j. Data used in 
calculating fractionalization indices includes more than 1,055 linguistic groups and 294 
religious specifications on more than two hundred countries. A higher fractionalization 
value signifies a large number of groups. 
A binary variable for democracy is included and determined by data from the 
POLITY-IV project, the most widely used database on regime change and authority 
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(Marshall, G. et al. 2000). If the POLITY variable is greater than 7 on average for the 
years 1980-2009, the democracy variable is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. If the POLITY 
variable is not available for a country, the LIEC and EIEC scores reported in the 
appendix of Blomberg and Hess (2005) are used. The LIEC and EIEC scores represent 
legislative and executive electoral competitiveness and come from the Database of 
Political Institutions (Beck 2001).  If LIEC and EIEC add up to fourteen the country is 
coded is considered a democracy, and not otherwise. Regional binary control variables 









National GDP Total gross domestic product of the nation. 
(Constant  2005 Intl. PPP) 
World Bank Global 
Development 
Indicators 
GDP per Capita National GDP divided by the population. 
(Constant  2005 Intl. PPP) 
World Bank Global 
Development 
Indicators 
Trade Openness Sum of the value of imports and exports as 
a percentage of national GDP (%) 
World Bank Global 
Development 
Indicators 
Democracy Binary variable: 1 if democracy, 0 
otherwise. Considered a democracy if 
polity variable is greater than 7. (1 or 0) 








A. Alesina (2003) 
Asia 1 if located on the Asian continent, 0 
otherwise. 
N/A 






National wealth as measured by GDP is a good indicator of the size and power of 
a nation.  Li and Schaub (2004) and Li (2005) find  increased size and government 
capacity of a nation to attract terrorism. One would expect countries with large national 
GDP to be of significant size and government capacity. Dreher and Gassebner (2008) 
find population size related to terrorism occurrence. Countries with large populations also 
tend to have a large national GDP. Blomberg and Hess (2005) show national GDP to be 
positively related to terrorism incidence with countries grouped from all income levels. 
Due to general agreement in the literature the following hypothesis is made. 
Hypothesis 1: Countries with large national GDP are attractive targets of CBRN 
terrorism. 
 Typically economic wellbeing at an individual level is measured by Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. There is no consensus in the literature on whether or 
not economic factors are good indicators of terrorism.  Piazza (2006) finds that economic 
development as proxied by Human Development Index (United Nations 2004), is not 
related to terrorism incidence. Abadie (2006)  and Dreher and Gassebner (2008) also find 
a lack of significance for economic development.  Tavares (2004) finds that per capita 
GDP is associated with an increasing number of total terrorist attacks. Burgoon (2006) 
finds government capacity to be associated with increased terrorism and government 
capacity is largely reflective of per capita GDP. Krueger and Laitin (2008) also echo the 
same findings. Still others have found the opposite to be true suggesting economic 
success reduces terrorism incidence. Li and Schaub (2004) and Bravo and Dias (2006) 
find that increasing GDP per capita reduces the likelihood of a terrorist attack on home 
soil. The main comparison paper for the economic development model finds per capita 
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GDP positively influencing terrorism in all income and high income countries while 
negatively influencing terrorism in low income countries. Due to a lack of agreement in 
the literature, results similar to those from the comparison paper are expected.  
Hypothesis 2: GDP per capita positively attracts CBRN terrorism in high and all income 
country groups. The opposite is expected in low income countries 
 Trade openness is defined as the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to the 
GDP of a nation. As trade openness increases, national perception from other nations is 
likely to improve due to the willingness to work with others and develop relationships 
abroad. Tensions between trading partners should be expected to decrease and provide 
less incentive for transnational terrorism between the two. From the literature, Drakos 
and Gofas (2006), Kurrild-Klitgaard, et. al. (2005),  and Blomberg and Hess (2005) all 
find trade openness to be associated with reduced terrorism events. Li and Schaub (2004) 
find that trade indirectly reduces transnational terrorism by promoting economic 
development, although it is not significant in itself. Tavares (2004) also finds a lack of 
significance for trade openness in his work. Due to the general agreement in the literature 
on the effect of trade openness on traditional terrorism, the same effect is hypothesized 
for CBRN terrorism. 
Hypothesis 3: Countries open of trade are less attractive targets of CBRN terrorism.  
Democracy as a political indicator commonly used throughout the literature. 
Presence of democracy can be measured by a binary variable and the degree of 
democracy can be measured by a continuous variable. In many cases it is measured by 
the Polity-IV index from the Polity Project (Marshall, G. et al. 2000). Abadie (2006) 
showed a democratic state does not necessarily promote terrorism, but rather the 
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transition from autocracy to democracy tends to increase terrorism. The same transitional 
vulnerabilities were found by Klitgaard et. al. (2005). Dreher and Gassebner (2008) 
found the opposite to be true, with a transition of increasing political freedom tending to 
reduce transnational terrorism incidence. Blomberg and Hess (2005), Eubank and 
Weinberg (2001), Li and Schaub (2004), and Burgoon (2006) associated high levels of 
democracy with increased terrorist attacks, while Bravo and Dias (2006) found that the 
opposite was true. Tavares (2004) suggested that increasingly democratic states reduced 
the economic impact of terrorist attacks but they do not reduce the incidence of terrorism.  
Li Quan (2005) found that increased democratic participation reduced the number of 
transnational terrorism incidents. He also found that a system of increased checks and 
balances limited the effectiveness of government to oppose terrorism.  
A positive correlation between democracy and terrorist incidence may be due to 
the ease of penetration of terrorist organizations into more democratic states. Enhanced 
freedoms associated with democracies allow for enhanced maneuverability of 
organizations, reducing cost and risk. Democracy may also positively correlate with 
terrorism due to underrepresentation of terrorist incidents by non-democratic nations. 
Ivanova and Sandler (2007) found a strong correlation between democratic states and 
increased CBRN terrorism.  
Hypothesis 4: Democratic states are more attractive targets than their non-
democratic counterparts. 
Literacy rate is used as a proxy for educational achievement. Blomberg and Hess 
(2005) and Krueger and Laitin (2008) found that literacy rate was negatively associated 
with transnational terrorism in low-income countries and insignificant in all others. Bravo 
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and Dias (2006) found low levels of literacy associated with higher terrorist incidence, 
while Tavares (2004) found illiteracy to be associated with reduced terrorism. However, 
Klitgaard et al. (2005) found literacy rate to be independent from terrorism incidence. An 
initial hypothesis is that well-developed nations can dedicate more resources to 
international affairs than those countries with more pressing developmental issues 
domestically. Increasing involvement in international affairs may result in ideological 
conflicts with terrorist organizations, resulting in a higher likelihood of CBRN incidence. 
Hypothesis 5: More educated states attract CBRN terrorism. 
 Blomberg and Hess (2005), Krueger and Laitin (2008), and Dreher and Fischer 
(2010) found that language fractionalization is not a significant factor in predicting 
traditional terrorism. Klitgaard et al. (2005) found language fractionalization to be of 
statistical significance but they did not find a consistent positive or negative relation 
across models. Tavares on the other hand found linguistic fractionalization to be 
significant and positively related to terrorism incidence. Increasing linguistic 
fractionalization could be an indicator of ethnic tolerance and may ease ethnic tensions 
within and abroad and result in fewer CBRN incidences. On the other hand, high 
fractionalization creates more opportunities for disagreement between groups leading 
potentially to political disagreements and political violence. Language fractionalization is 
not consistently significant in the literature, however we include it for comparison with 
Blomberg and Hess (2005). 




As with language, Blomberg and Hess (2005) found a lack of significance and 
consistency with religious fractionalization. Krueger and Laitin (2008), and Dreher and 
Fischer (2010) found religious fractionalization to have no effect on the targets of 
terrorism.  Klitgaard et al. (2005) and Tavares (2004) found religious fractionalization to 
be negatively associated with terrorism. Piazza (2006) found no significance for religious 
diversity by itself, yet when combining population and religious diversity he found more 
populous, ethnically and religiously diverse nations to be at greater risk for a terrorist 
attack. He argued that nations with large ethnic and religious fractionalization are more 
prone to also feature a large number of political parties. Large numbers of political 
factions may reduce political stability, foster extremist activities, and lead to political 
violence. On the other hand, as with linguistic fractionalization, increasing religious 
fractionalization could ease ethnic tensions domestically and abroad and reduce 
motivation for CBRN terrorism. As with language fractionalization, it is included to be 
consistent with Blomberg and Hess (2005). 
Hypothesis 7: Religious fractionalization is not significantly indicative of CBRN 
terrorism venues. 
 
Political Risk Model 
For the political risk model panel data on 61 countries was examined. Yearly data 
for the panel model spans from 1984 to 2009. The International Country Risk Guide is 
the main provider of the panel data.  
A measure of democracy is provided by the Polity-IV project (Marshall, G. et al. 
2000). It contains data on 163 countries from 1800 to 2009. The democracy indicator is 
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rated from zero to ten and is a composite of three separate measures including 
competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. A higher score indicates a more 
democratic regime. 
Law and order is given a max score of 6, with each component given a max of 3 
points. Law measures the strength and impartiality of the legal system while order 
measures whether or not the law tends to be obeyed. 
Corruption is measured on a scale of 0 to 6 and includes a variety of measures. It 
is concerned with corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job 
reservations, favor-for-favors, secret party funding, and close ties between business and 
politics. 
GDP is provided by The World Bank’s World Development Indicators (The 
World Bank 2010).  Data is provided on a yearly basis and used for the years 1984-2009. 
The values of GDP are logged before coded into the dataset. 
Ethnic tension is scored on a scale between 0 and 6 and measures the degree of 
tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions.  Low 
scores indicate high tension, while high scores indicate a tolerance for such ethnic 
divisions. 
Socio-economic condition is a variable scored from 0 to 12 points and is 
comprised of three separate sub-components. These components include unemployment, 
consumer confidence, and poverty. A high score is representative of very low risk while a 
low score is indicative of very high risk. 
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Internal conflict is measured from 0 to 12 and measures the actual or potential of 
intrastate political conflict on governance. It is comprised of three sub-components 
including civil war / coup threat, terrorism/political violence, and civil disorder.  A high 
score is given to countries with no civil or armed opposition towards the government and 
when the government does not engage in direct or indirect violence against its own 
people. 
Similar to internal conflict, external conflict is scored from 0 to 12 and is 
comprised of three sub components. These include war, cross-border conflict, and foreign 
pressures. Thus it captures both violent acts in war and cross-border conflict and non-
violent acts in foreign pressures. Non violent acts include trade restrictions, withholding 
of aid, territorial disputes, and sanctions. As with internal conflict a high score indicates a 
low risk and a low score is indicative of high risk. 
Government stability measures the ability of the government to carry out its 
objectives and its ability to remain in office. It is measured on a scale from 0 to 12 and is 
comprised of three sub-components including government unity, legislative strength, and 
popular support. 
Military government is measured on a scale of 0 to 6 and measures the 
involvement of the military in political proceedings. A military takeover may represent 
high risk since it may be an indication that the government is unable to function 
effectively. Military involvement in an unstable government may provide temporary 
stability, although in the long run the system of governance is likely to become corrupt 
and develop an armed opposition. 
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Religious tension is scored from 0 to 6. Tensions may increase as a single 
religious group seeks to dominate society and government and replace civil law by 
religious law. Tensions may also rise as one religious group seeks to exclude others from 
the political and social process.  Suppression of religious freedom also contributes to 
religious tension. Religious tension may result in inappropriate policies in government or 
create civil unrest with an increased potential for civil war. 




Table 2: Political risk model independent variables & sources. 
Independent Variable Description Source 
Democracy Democracy Rating 
from 0-10 
POLITY IV Project 
Rule of Law Rating from 0-6 International Country Risk Guide 
Honesty (Lack of 
Corruption) 
Rating from 0-6 International Country Risk Guide 
GDP Per Capita In terms of 2005 
International PPP 
The World Bank 
Socio-economic 
Conditions Rating from 0-12 International Country Risk Guide 
Ethnic Tensions 
Rating from 0-6 International Country Risk Guide 
Gov. Stability 
Rating from 0-12 International Country Risk Guide 
Internal Conflict 
Rating from 0-12 International Country Risk Guide 
External Conflict 
Rating from 0-12 International Country Risk Guide 
Military Involvement 
Rating from 0-6 International Country Risk Guide 
Religious Tensions 




Democracy is an important regime characteristic which has been studied 
extensively in relation to terrorism incidence, although its influence on terrorism is not 
perfectly clear. According to Martha Crenshaw (1981), a major condition that fosters 
terrorism is a lack of opportunity for political participation.  The denial of power to the 
people can create dissatisfaction amongst citizens, increasing the likelihood of turning to 
terrorism as an alternative way to have their voices heard. Eubank and Weinberg  (2001) 
also argue that increased political participation will reduce the instances of terrorism.  
Under a democratic regime all ethnic, religious, and racial groups are permitted to 
participate in the political process and thus have a greater chance of achieving their 
political goals peacefully. This should reduce the number of those citizens that turn to 
violence. Another view on democracy suggests democratic governments are more 
susceptible to terrorism. Jeffrey Ross (1993) contends that democratic regimes offer the 
freedom of movement, media, and proliferation of narrow-based social issues which may 
promote terrorism.  Empirical results on democracy’s influence on terrorism seem to 
largely link democracy with increased terrorist activity. Eubank and Weinberg (2001), 
Blomberg and Hess (2005), Li and Schaub (2004), and Burgoon (2006) all found this 
positive association between democracy and terrorism.  Li Quan (2005) and Bravo and 
Dias (2006) found the opposite to be true with democratic participation leading to 
reduced transnational terrorism. It is hypothesize that any increased movement and 
freedom allowed under a democratic regime will encourage terrorism and overshadow 




Hypothesis 1: Increasingly democratic states are more attractive targets for 
CBRN terrorism. 
Ivanova and Sandler (2007) include rule of law as a regime characteristic in their 
study on CBRN incidents. Countries with a strong rule of law employ fair and just 
systems to uphold the law and find the majority of citizens obey said law. They find that 
rule of law is positively correlated with increased CBRN incidents within a country. 
Terrorists may seek targets with a strong rule of law as a show of strength and to 
demonstrate that perhaps the government is weaker than publicly accepted. In David 
Fromkin’s Strategy of Terrorism (1975) it is suggested that terrorists believe they can 
bring about government collapse by demonstrating public authorities are powerless to 
enforce law and order. 
 The opposite argument suggests a country with a fair legal process could have 
implications on preventing terrorist attacks within its borders.  As Laura Dickinson 
(2001) states “… a process that is widely perceived as fair strengthens the multilateral 
intergovernmental efforts needed to combat terrorism.  At the same time, such a process 
may gain greater acceptance within societies around the world, thereby at least playing a 
part in helping to defuse the resentment toward the United States that may be one of the 
root causes of terrorism.” While this statement is focused on the United States, it is easily 
transferable to any other nation around the globe. However based off of the result of law 
and order in Ivanova and Sandler’s (2007) previous work, hypothesis 2 is stated below. 




Corruption is another regime characteristic included in the previous work on 
CBRN terrorism by Ivanova and Sandler(2007) . The results of their odds ratio testing 
and regression approach demonstrate different associations of corruption with CBRN 
terrorism. Honesty is found to be negatively associated with CBRN terrorism in the 
regression approach, and positively associated in the odds ratio examination. The 
Whitehouse has suggested that corruption is positively associated with increased 
terrorism stating in its periodically published National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America (2002)  “…poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak 
states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.” Louise 
Shelley (2004) finds that terrorist organizations, transnational crime, and often found 
together in regions with shadow economies. Recent transnational crime groups are less 
dependent on long-term sustainability, allowing them to operate in regions of political 
corruption and chaos. Often transnational crime provides source funding for terrorist 
organizations suggesting a positive link between terrorism and corruption. Dishonesty in 
government could also hinder attempts at peaceful reform through democratic ideals, 
leading minority groups to engage in violent means to achieve their goals.  
Das, DiRienzo et al. (2007) found a non-linear relationship with regards to 
corruption and terrorism. Their results showed corrupt regimes to experience more 
terrorism as this “…can generate feelings of repression in the disadvantaged parties.” 
They also back up former President Bush’s comments that “corrupt governments are 
generally weak and unable to patrol borders and enforce order, making them susceptible 
to terrorism.” In addition they found low government corruption to be associated with 
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increased terrorism risk. Countries with lower corruption attract terrorism indirectly since 
they tend to be freer and wealthier. 
Hypothesis 3: Honest governments experience reduced CBRN terrorism incidence. 
As described previously in economic development model, there exists no general 
agreement in the literature on per capita wealth’s relation to terrorism incidence. Many 
find economic variables to be insignificant in their relation to terrorism venues, others 
suggest targets of terrorism tend to be well off financially. Still others say improving 
economic conditions tend to discourage terrorism, particularly in low income states. 
Brian Burgoon (2006) states “Popular intuition suggests that poverty and low 
income spur terrorism by causing suffering and grievances that, in turn, fuel political 
extremism and terrorism.” Economic deprivation may create social discontent and anger, 
enticing some to turn to political violence (Gurr 1970). Former president George W. 
Bush has stated “Poverty does not transform poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet 
poverty, corruption and repression are a toxic combination in many societies, leading to weak 
governments that are unable to enforce order or patrol their borders and are vulnerable to 
terrorist networks and drug cartels” (2002).Krueger and Laitin (2008) find no economic basis 
for the source of terrorism yet they find that “…the targets are countries that bask in 
economic success.” Ivanova and Sandler (2007) also find wealthy nations to be targets of 
CBRN terrorism. Based off the previous findings from Blomberg and Hess, a similar result is 
expected as in the economic development model. 
Hypothesis 4: Increasing individual wealth in higher income countries is associated with 




A measure of ethnic tension is also included in the model. Martha Crenshaw  (1981) 
suggests ethnic-tensions as a cause of terrorism. She writes “The first condition that can 
be considered a direct cause of terrorism is the existence of concrete grievances among an 
identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated 
against by the majority. A social movement develops in order to redress these grievances 
and to gain either equal rights or a separate state; terrorism is then the resort of an 
extremist faction of this broader movement.” Piazza  (2006) and Bravo and Dias (2006) 
found more diverse societies more likely to experience terrorism. Dreher and Fischer  
(2010) included ethnic fractionalization in their regression analysis however they found it 
insignificant.  Brian Lai (2003) hypothesized that ethnic discrimination could lead to acts 
of terrorism based off of work by Gurr (1970). This ethnic discrimination could be both 
political and economical and either a result of formal exclusion or underrepresentation. 
His results confirmed his initial hypothesis as he states “Political and economic 
deprivation of a group is likely to increase the number of terrorist incidents against a 
state…” (Lai 2003). Ethnic tensions are predicted to catalyze any discontent of sub-state 
actors, possibly leading them to pursue physical violence. 
Hypothesis 5: Countries with increasing ethnic tensions are more likely to experience a 
CBRN incident. 
Similar to national wealth, this more specifically measures poverty, 
unemployment, and consumer confidence. Burgoon (2006) argues that “…social welfare 
policies -- including social security, unemployment, and health and education spending -- 
affect preferences and capacities of social actors in ways that, on balance, discourage 
terrorism: by reducing poverty, inequality, and socioeconomic insecurity, thereby 
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diminishing incentives to commit or tolerate terrorism, and by weakening extremist 
political and religious organizations and practice that provide economic and cognitive 
security where public safety nets are lacking.” He finds that reducing poverty and 
socioeconomic insecurity through social welfare policies, terrorism incidence is reduced. 
Piazza (2006) states  “…the average national unemployment rate for each country, would 
be expected to bear a significant positive relationship with terrorism, as unemployment 
precipitates the stress of idle workers who might suffer from unmet economic 
expectations and therefore turn to political violence, as predicted by Gurr’s ‘‘relative 
deprivation’’ model” (Gurr 1970) . We expect better socio-economic conditions to reduce 
terrorism incidence. 
Hypothesis 6: Nations with more favorable socio-economic conditions can less likely to 
experience a CBRN attack. 
One might expect internal conflict to mainly influence domestic terrorism and not 
affect international terrorism, yet this is not the case. Both international and domestic 
terrorism can grow out of civil war or lead to it, but such a conflict transformation is 
more likely when terrorism is domestic” (Sambanis 2008).  The motivators behind a fully 
fledged civil war and terrorist beginnings are not necessarily the same, however 
Sambanis provides evidence that overreaction by a state regime to terrorist activities may 
end up rallying support for terrorist organizations leading to escalated conflict. 
“Indiscriminate use of state repression in response to terrorism serves to mobilize the 
masses including moderates who would not otherwise support the terrorists.”  He states 
further “…terrorism and civil war are adjacent phenomena. Terrorists with legitimacy 
become revolutionaries and failed rebellions can give way to sporadic terrorist violence 
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by the remnants of rebel armies.”  Lai (2007) states “Governments involved in a civil war 
are not likely to have the resources available to effectively control their territory, 
allowing groups to organize without fear of government reprisals.” This should make it 
easier for terrorist groups not only to form, but to carry out attacks as well. Thus the 
following is hypothesized.  
 
Hypothesis 7: Nations involved dealing with internal conflicts can expect increased 
CBRN incidence. 
States involved in military conflict with another party must have their differences 
either economically, politically, or ideologically. This may influence fringe groups to 
resort to acts of violence against innocent people of the opposing nation, whether they are 
domestic or abroad. Conversely, terrorist goals may not be aligned with national goals or 
ideals so external conflict may not affect those with extreme views likely to take part in 
terrorism. Li and Schaub include external conflict as a dichotomous independent variable 
and find that while the coefficient is positive, it is not significant. According to Lai 
(2007) , devotion to an external conflict may consume resources necessary to secure 
borders and monitor terrorist groups. He states “In addition to a civil war, states involved 
in an interstate war are also likely to have less ability to control their own borders. 
Similar to the effects of involvement in a civil war, interstate conflict can potentially 
create a situation where a government’s resources are unavailable to address internal 
problems.” A country’s focus on an external enemy may leave them vulnerable to 
terrorism, whether it is domestic or international, regardless of the national alignment of 
the terrorist organization. The following prediction is made for external conflicts relation 
to CBRN terrorism. 
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Hypothesis 8: Nations involved in external conflicts are subject to increased CBRN 
terrorism likelihood. 
According to Frey and Luechinger (2002), government stability can help reduce 
terrorist attacks.  The attraction of violent actions on the part of terrorists is diminished as 
they prove to have less effect on the political stability …” If terrorists do not achieve the 
end result they were looking for, it may demotivate them to continue with violent attacks. 
One could also see the argument the other way, as a government proves its stability it 
becomes a more attractive target to those seeking to destabilize it, as it may demonstrate 
terrorist group’s capabilities. Eubank and Weinberg  (2001) find that stable democracies 
were much more likely to be the target of terrorist attacks compared to insecure 
democracies. “Perhaps civil wars and other forms of high magnitude political violence 
tend to occur in weak, insecure democracies, as they enter or sometimes exit the 
democratic column. This does not appear to be the case with terrorism however. It is the 
stable, secure centripetal democracies which are the most vulnerable to terrorist violence; 
that is where the events occur most frequently, that is where their perpetrators and 
victims tend to come from” (Eubank and Weinberg 2001). Crenshaw (1981) suggests 
why stable democracies might be more susceptible to terrorism. She states, “Perhaps 
terrorism is most likely to occur precisely where mass passivity and elite dissatisfaction 
coincide. Discontent is not generalized or severe enough to provoke the majority of the 
populace to action against the regime, yet a small minority, without access to the bases of 
power that would permit overthrow of the government through coup d’état or subversion, 
seeks radical change. Terrorism may thus be a sign of a stable society rather than a 
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symptom of fragility and impending collapse.”  It is therefore hypothesized that stable 
governments are attractive targets. 
Hypothesis 9: Government stability is can promote CBRN incidence. 
Military governments are also investigated. A capable military government may 
be willing to use physical force more quickly against possible threats than a traditional 
government operation, which could hinder the motivations of terrorists.  Crenshaw 
(1981) notes that military regimes in the past have crushed terrorist organizations in their 
respective countries. De la Roche (1996) suggests that military regimes could be more 
susceptible to terrorism when she states “Invasions, military dictatorships, and other 
patterns of domination provide fertile conditions for terrorism.” Kittner (2007) notes the 
culture of violence caused by the presence of military regimes in Latin America. A 
culture of violence is more likely to passively accept terrorism than a non-violent one. It 
is predicted that a culture of violence and domination cultivated by a military government 
will encourage terrorism and overpower any reduction in terrorism caused by a display of 
physical force. 
Hypothesis 10: Militarized governments are more likely to experience CBRN terrorism 
than non-militarized governments. 
Religious tension has been examined in the past in relation to terrorism. Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) examined the effect of religious fractionalization on civil war and 
found it not to be significant. As discussed previously, both domestic and international 
terrorism can be born out of civil wars. Religious tensions increase if one religious group 
is dominant over all others or has significant power in influencing national politics. 
Iannacone and Berman (2006) write “Conflict and militancy becomes common, however, 
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where the state favors one religious group over another (or there is an expectation that the 
state will do so after it is established), thereby raising the stakes for all sides.” They 
continue to argue that sectarian groups can become effective terrorists if they feel they 
can benefit by increasing their political power. A reduction in state support of religion 
reduces the financial and protective benefits received from government, making political 
involvement much less attractive for religious sects. Removal of religion from politics 
reduces the potential for one religious group to have immense power over the opposition.   











Economic Development Model 
 
The most basic regression model available is the ordinary least squares model. 
This model is not entirely suited for count data with high over dispersion. The result table 
for the OLS economic development model is available in the appendix. 
Due to a large number of zero counts a traditional OLS squares regression 
approach is shown to be biased and inconsistent.  Censored regression models have been 
developed for dealing with this situation. One such censored regression model is the 
Tobit model (Tobin 1958). The standard Tobit model involves a dependent variable that 
is left-censored at zero. The Tobit model is described by equations 17 and 18. 
 (17)     
 (18)    
 yi * is a latent variable which is not observed, xi is a vector of independent data, and β is 
vector of unknown coefficient parameters (Cameron 1998). Tobit results can also be 
found in the appendix. 
Neither OLS nor Tobit models are ideal for analyzing count data so a Poisson 
model is used as well. The Poisson regression results can be found in the appendix. The 
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Poisson model improves the significance of many of the coefficients yet is still not the 
best regression model available for this purpose. Since our data is not only count data, but 
over dispersed count data, we can upgrade from a Poisson regression model to a negative 
binomial model.  Improvement can be seen in figure 1 below looking at the predicted 




Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of Poisson and negative binomial Models. 
 
 
The negative binomial model more accurately predicts the zero and low counts 
than the Poisson model does. The poisson model underpredicts the zero frequency and 
overpredicts the frequency of the low counts. 
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Figure 2 shows the reduction in pearson residuals by utilizing a negative binomial 














Table 3: Econ development model: negative binomial cross sectional results: Monterey data. 
 All Income Low Income High Income 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
GDP 1.266*** 1.246*** 1.040*** 1.598*** 1.650*** 1.035*** 0.995*** 0.871*** 0.790*** 
 (6.78) (7.00) (6.47) (4.23) (4.27) (2.89) (4.98) (4.89) (4.57) 
GDP/Cap -1.200*** -1.538*** -1.300*** -1.585** -2.483*** -1.825** -0.618 -0.743* -0.812* 
 (-3.47) (-4.01) (-3.98) (-2.17) (-3.05) (-2.23) (-1.43) (-1.65) (-1.82) 
Trade 1.312** 1.137** 0.571 3.239*** 2.562*** 2.050** 0.0653 -0.594 -0.740 
 (2.35) (2.34) (1.15) (3.19) (3.70) (2.49) (0.12) (-1.04) (-1.39) 
Democracy 1.497*** 1.679*** 2.085*** -0.831 -1.385 -0.0931 1.318** 1.103** 1.659*** 
 (2.78) (3.04) (4.46) (-0.76) (-1.12) (-0.06) (2.51) (2.00) (3.26) 
Literacy Rate  2.603* 2.599*  4.419** 2.097  5.563** 8.979*** 
  (1.66) (1.86)  (2.17) (0.91)  (2.12) (2.99) 
Lang  -0.314 0.359  1.415 0.921  1.781 1.574 
  (-0.33) (0.38)  (0.96) (0.52)  (1.50) (1.52) 
Religion  -0.567 0.200  -4.192** -0.887  -0.270 -0.400 
  (-0.61) (0.24)  (-2.40) (-0.33)  (-0.27) (-0.43) 
Asia   1.624***   15.63***   1.632*** 
   (4.04)   (12.47)   (3.46) 
Africa   -0.387   13.76***   0.870 
   (-0.58)   (12.52)   (0.89) 
Constant -27.33*** -25.02*** -20.89*** -40.54*** -34.50*** -36.77*** -20.56*** -18.88*** -19.44*** 
 (-6.17) (-6.28) (-4.83) (-3.60) (-3.66) (-4.58) (-3.76) (-3.66) (-3.57) 
N 175 164 164 64 62 62 111 102 102 
F          
LL -186.5 -183.8 -176.9 -61.79 -58.45 -56.18 -119.2 -117.3 -113.6 
LL (Null) -220.6 -217.3 -217.3 -73.67 -73.08 -73.08 -145.5 -142.7 -142.7 




National GDP is positive and significant in across all income levels. GDP per 
capita is also highly significant yet shows a negative relationship with CBRN terrorism.  
Trade openness is found to be positive and significant in lower income countries.  
Democracy is positive and significant excluding low-income countries. Literacy rate is 
also positive and significant in most models. Neither language nor religious 
fractionalization has any predictive value for CBRN terrorism venues. 
The negative binomial cross sectional regressions were also run against data from 
the START Global Terrorism Database to see if results were comparable. Results from 






Table 4: Econ development model: negative binomial cross sectional results: GTD data. 
  All Income  Low 
Income 
  High 
Income 
 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
GDP 0.915*** 0.920*** 0.801*** 1.107*** 1.125*** 0.600*** 0.805*** 0.738*** 0.716*** 
 (6.17) (5.28) (5.48) (5.52) (5.57) (3.16) (5.25) (4.58) (4.33) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
-0.775*** -1.077*** -0.996*** -1.714** -2.341*** -1.618** -0.882*** -0.917*** -0.921*** 
 (-2.64) (-3.73) (-3.68) (-2.02) (-3.28) (-2.47) (-2.96) (-2.62) (-2.80) 
Trade 0.120 0.0547 -0.315 2.766*** 2.661*** 2.493*** -0.628 -1.121** -1.140** 
 (0.28) (0.11) (-0.71) (3.82) (2.96) (4.23) (-1.10) (-2.35) (-2.30) 
Democracy 1.168*** 1.396*** 1.473*** 0.867 0.882 1.802*** 1.444*** 1.540*** 1.641*** 
 (2.70) (3.16) (3.20) (0.76) (0.87) (3.19) (4.27) (3.84) (3.91) 
Literacy Rate  1.977 1.791  2.299 -0.232  3.806 3.608 
  (0.99) (1.04)  (1.22) (-0.23)  (1.56) (1.33) 
Lang  0.116 0.673  0.763 1.412  1.679 1.644 
  (0.14) (0.73)  (0.77) (1.41)  (1.54) (1.41) 
Religion  -0.781 -0.248  -1.408 2.820*  -1.004 -0.902 
  (-1.04) (-0.30)  (-1.42) (1.89)  (-1.04) (-0.86) 
Asia   0.472   17.71***   0.393 
   (1.20)   (12.79)   (0.86) 
Africa   -0.967   14.90***   -0.125 
   (-1.14)   (11.85)   (-0.16) 
Constant -17.63*** -16.32*** -12.80*** -26.73*** -23.51*** -32.53*** -10.77* -10.34** -9.641* 
 (-5.09) (-4.22) (-3.16) (-3.95) (-3.36) (-5.59) (-1.95) (-2.07) (-1.74) 
N 175 164 164 64 62 62 111 102 102 
LL -153.6 -149.5 -147.1 -43.39 -42.15 -36.46 -101.9 -97.96 -97.58 
LL(Null) -191.0 -185.6 -185.6 -56.42 -55.92 -55.92 -132.8 -127.9 -127.9 
Alpha 1.786 1.734 1.661 0.818 0.832 2.26e-22 1.196 1.068 1.038 
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The results echo many of the findings from the negative binomial regression 
findings from the Monterey Institute Data. National GDP, GDP per capita and democracy 
all show similar significance and relationship with CBRN terrorism.  Trade openness is 
also positive and significant in both models, yet the GTD results show trade openness in 
higher income countries to actually deter CBRN terrorism. Additionally literacy rate is 
not found to be significant in the GTD results. Once again neither language nor religious 
fractionalization was found to be a significant indicator of CBRN terrorism. 
Panel data from the Monterey Database was also analyzed with results shown below in 





Table 5: Econ development model: negative binomial panel results. 
  All Income  Low Income  High income  
 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
GDP 0.916*** 0.987*** 0.859*** 0.848*** 0.933*** 0.519** 1.086*** 1.186*** 1.139*** 
 (6.91) (5.70) (4.99) (5.07) (4.44) (2.06) (4.48) (4.45) (4.53) 
GDP/Cap -0.553* -1.309** -1.046** -1.258 -1.873** -1.504** -0.286 -0.974 -0.897 
 (-1.87) (-2.57) (-2.41) (-1.35) (-2.37) (-2.15) (-0.61) (-1.58) (-1.56) 
Trade 0.216 0.203 0.134 1.490*** 1.066** 1.083* 0.0747 -0.155 -0.0350 
 (0.56) (0.54) (0.33) (2.64) (2.23) (1.83) (0.14) (-0.34) (-0.08) 
Democracy 0.312** 1.554** 2.157*** 0.138 0.0993 0.936 0.371*** 1.509** 2.235*** 
 (1.99) (2.50) (3.36) (0.20) (0.11) (1.07) (3.12) (2.29) (3.22) 
Literacy Rate  3.918*** 3.219**  3.812** 1.542  5.594* 5.865* 
  (2.66) (2.36)  (2.34) (1.09)  (1.69) (1.91) 
Lang  0.194 -0.00139  0.139 -0.0219  1.921 1.160 
  (0.21) (-0.00)  (0.13) (-0.02)  (1.62) (1.08) 
Religion  -1.209 -0.458  -3.689** -0.493  -1.631 -1.456 
  (-1.24) (-0.48)  (-2.43) (-0.27)  (-1.52) (-1.18) 
Asia   0.352   14.61***   1.413 
   (0.52)   (13.40)   (1.35) 
Africa   1.654***   16.84***   1.604*** 
   (4.25)   (13.23)   (3.11) 
Constant -22.29*** -20.84*** -20.21*** -20.61*** -17.67*** -26.11*** -28.95*** -29.88*** -30.98*** 
 (-5.85) (-5.12) (-4.48) (-4.87) (-3.06) (-4.09) (-4.38) (-4.41) (-4.07) 
N 4153 3892 3892 1522 1477 1477 2631 2415 2415 
LL -742.6 -721.8 -703.0 -219.3 -205.2 -198.1 -500.7 -486.0 -472.3 
LL(Null) -871.6 -861.7 -861.7 -238.8 -237.5 -237.5 -627.0 -617.6 -617.6 




Political Risk Model 
 
Results from the political risk model are shown below in table 6. Regression 
analysis for the political risk model was run as a panel regression since yearly data was 
available for all independent variables. 
Table 6: Political risk model : negative binomial panel regression. 
  All 
Income 
  Low 
Income 
  High 
Income 
 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Democracy 0.217*** 0.154*** 0.176*** 0.181*** 0.149*** 0.164 0.239*** 0.0605 0.0280 
 (4.71) (2.65) (3.19) (3.45) (2.59) (1.59) (3.28) (0.49) (0.28) 
Rule of Law 0.209 0.126 0.487*** 0.158 0.177 0.250 0.216 -0.158 0.159 
 (1.26) (0.74) (2.84) (0.69) (0.75) (0.96) (1.01) (-0.70) (0.76) 
Corruption -0.325** -0.367** -0.200 -0.158 -0.164 -0.287 -0.373** -0.383** -0.151 
 (-2.13) (-2.30) (-1.37) (-0.62) (-0.62) (-0.80) (-2.10) (-2.27) (-0.96) 
GDP/Cap  0.375 0.446*  0.667 0.516  1.562*** 2.005*** 
  (1.42) (1.73)  (1.64) (1.02)  (2.98) (4.09) 
Socio-economic 
Cond. 
 -0.231***   0.0979   -0.392*** 
   (-2.94)   (0.92)   (-5.33) 
Ethnic Tensions  -0.133   -0.186   -0.161 
   (-0.69)   (-1.11)   (-0.68) 
Gov. Stability   0.158**   0.352**   0.144* 
   (2.05)   (2.35)   (1.82) 
Internal 
Conflict 
  -0.156   -0.219**   -0.153 
   (-1.48)   (-2.11)   (-1.24) 
External 
Conflict 
  -0.183   -0.0766   -0.208 
   (-1.57)   (-0.81)   (-1.40) 
Military 
Involvement 
  -0.0352   0.134   0.0125 
   (-0.24)   (0.56)   (0.05) 
Religious 
Tensions 
  0.226   0.0682   0.509*** 
   (1.57)   (0.20)   (2.58) 
Constant -
2.901*** 
-5.413*** -5.317*** -2.988*** -7.821*** -7.875*** -2.927*** -14.92*** -18.22*** 
 (-4.29) (-3.10) (-3.09) (-6.97) (-3.04) (-2.69) (-2.76) (-3.67) (-4.44) 
N 1493 1423 1423 407 350 350 1086 1073 1073 
LL -653.8 -638.0 -622.3 -135.5 -125.3 -120.3 -516.6 -504.5 -486.9 
LL(Null) -674.3 -658.5 -658.5 -140.8 -130.4 -130.4 -528.6 -524.2 -524.2 




Results from the political risk model are not as consistent as results from the 
economic development models. Democracy level for the all income countries was 
significant and positive. A lack of corruption also showed signs of a reduction effect in 
both high-income and all income groups. Per capita GDP was significant in high-income 
models with a positive coefficient sign. A positive coefficient sign differs from the 
negative sign found in the economic development model, probably due to the lack of 
national GDP included in the political risk model. Improved socio-economic conditions 
show a significant negative coefficient in both high-income and all-income models. 
Government stability was positive and significant across all income levels. A negative 
coefficient can be seen for a lack of internal conflict in low income countries. Finally 
increasing religious tensions in middle/high-income countries increases the probability of 
a CBRN terrorism event. Significance was not found for rule of law, ethnic tensions, 








This section of the results looks at the non-parametric simulation of CBRN 
incidents based upon statistical replication of historical data.  Yearly and quarterly CBRN 
counts from 1980-2009 from the START GTD are used as the historical representation. 
Initially a series of 30 years or 120 quarters of data is simulated entirely and compared 
with historical values. Figure 3 below shows the frequencies of historical and simulated 
counts respectively.  The simulated series captures the increased frequency of the zero 
counts and mid-level counts.  
 





Figure 4: Variogram of historical and simulated yearly CBRN data. 
The semi-variogram in figure 4 shows an excellent match between historical and 
simulated datasets. The simulated data closely matches the spatial properties of the 
historical series. Both the historical and simulated series are displayed below in figure 5. 
The series do not necessarily match up exactly however general timing trends agree well. 
 
Figure 5: Historical and simulated yearly CBRN incidents 
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In figure 6, histograms for historical and simulated quarterly CBRN data are 
shown. Again the simulated frequency trends match the historical frequency trends fairly 
well. The zero counts are under predicted in the simulated series and in exchange over 
predicting counts of 2.  
 
 






Figure 7: Variogram of historical and simulated quarterly CBRN data 
 
Figure 7 shows the semi-variograms between historical and simulated data match 
quite well.  Figure 8 below shows the historical and simulated series over time.  
 
Figure 8: Historical and simulated quarterly CBRN incidents. 
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Additionally, a 60 year series is generated this time keeping the first 30 years 
equal to the historical data. This generates a future simulation of 30 years while matching 
exactly the first 30 years to the historical data.  Figure 9 below shows the extrapolated 
simulated series for yearly data. The future simulation predicts 8 years of 2 or less 
incidents during the next 30. It also predicts 8 years of more than 10 incidents per year. 
The max number of incidents in any year in the predicted series is 19. 
 
 
Figure 9: Extrapolated yearly CBRN incidents. 
 





Figure 10: Histogram of extrapolated yearly CBRN incidents. 
The simulated configuration predicts a high frequency of 2 counts compared with the 
historical series. Figure 11 below shows 30 years of simulated extrapolated quarterly 
CBRN data from the original 30 years 
 
Figure 11: Extrapolated quarterly CBRN incidents. 
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Frequencies from the quarterly extrapolation are provided in the histogram in 
figure 12 below.  The frequencies from the quarterly extrapolation are better matched 
with their historical data compared with yearly data. 
 










Economic Development Model 
 
From the economic development model we find similarities with the Blomberg & 
Hess work. National GDP is found to be positive and significant in all models for CBRN 
terrorism, while conventional terrorism results from Blomberg & Hess show GDP 
positive and significant for all income and low income groups. This confirms our 
hypothesis that countries with higher national GDP levels tend to be targets of CBRN 
terrorism.  
Blomberg and Hess find individual wealth to reduce terrorism likelihood in low-
income countries only. They find the opposite effect in middle/high and all-income 
countries. From our CBRN results, we find similar results for the low-income countries, 
however we find the coefficients for individual wealth to be negative across all models, 
including high and all-income countries.  
Openness to trade was found most significant in low income countries, having a 
positive correlation. This disagrees with the initial hypothesis that nations more open to 
trade would be less at risk of a CBRN event. This positive coefficient is in agreement 
with findings from Blomberg and Hess. We did not find trade openness to have an effect 
strictly concerning wealthy nations, while Blomberg and Hess find increasing trade 
openness to reduce conventional terror.  
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Democracy is positively associated with increased CBRN terrorism in developed 
and all country models, opposite to findings from Blomberg and Hess, but in agreement 
with many results found in the discussed literature. This is also in agreement with the 
initial hypothesis that democratic states are more likely to experience CBRN terrorism 
than states with non-democratic regimes. 
 Literacy rate had a positive correlation in the developed country and all country 
models in results from the Monterey Database, and insignificant in results from the 
START database. The literacy rate coefficient was negative for conventional terrorism, 
but only showed significance in developing countries. This disagreement between results 
hinders a concrete conclusion to be drawn about literacy rate and CBRN terrorism. 
Literacy rate is may be of more interest when looking at the origins of CBRN terrorism, 
rather than targets. 
As predicted, neither linguistic nor religious fractionalization was predictive of 
CBRN terrorism venues. This also agrees with the findings from Blomberg and Hess’ 
analysis of conventional terrorism. Neither linguistic nor religious fractionalization is 
consistently found to significant predictors of conventional terrorism in any of the 
reviewed literature.  
Political Risk Model 
 
Results from the political risk models show in general increasing democracy level 
is positively correlated with CBRN terrorism. This falls in line with our initial prediction 
and is in agreement with the binary predictor from the economic development model. 
Democracy level change was also looked into but found a lack of significance. Changes 
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in democracy level were cited in the literature as having more predictive value for 
conventional terrorism but this is not found to be true for CBRN terrorism.  
Lack of corruption is also shows a tendency to reduce CBRN incidents, at least in 
middle/high income and all income groups. This agrees with our initial prediction that 
honest regimes attract less CBRN terrorism than corrupt regimes. 
GDP per capita was significant and positive in the middle/high income country 
group, in line with Ivanova and Sandler’s findings of per capita GDP positive and 
significant in their analysis of CBRN terrorism.  The lack of national GDP’s inclusion in 
the political risk model might be an explanation as to why the sign of the coefficient is 
positive in this model and negative in the economic development model.  
 Improved socio economic conditions reduce CBRN incidence as predicted. 
Improved socio-economic conditions reduce the overall level of discontent within a 
society and minimize potential for a culture of violence. 
 Government stability shows a tendency to encourage CBRN terrorism and is 
significant in all models. In agreement with the hypothesis, it seems that stable 
governments can alienate fringe groups that seek change, when the overall majority is 
satisfied with the status quo. 
Internal conflict was significant for the low income countries, suggesting that 
perhaps governmental response to civil unrest in low-income countries could motivate 
terrorist activities.  
 Religious tensions were found significant high income countries respectively. 
Strong religious influence on government in high income countries may provoke violence 
from opposing religious sects.  
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From the economic development models we find on the whole that wealthy, 
populous, democratic states are more likely to experience CBRN terrorism than their 
small, poor, non democratic counterparts. The political risk model additionally suggests 
that high level democracies are more at risk than low level ones. Stable, corrupt regimes 




The simulated annealing simulations present future extrapolated series of both 
yearly and quarterly CBRN incidents. Both results show possible future incidence counts 
based off of 30 years of historical data.  Extrapolated predictions are the best results of 
few trial runs each for both yearly and quarterly data. Ideally, numerous simulations 
would be performed to present a predictive range for both frequency and time series data. 
Finding the correct cooling schedule for the simulated annealing optimizations is a 




The results provided in this paper provide a basic overview of the predictive 
effects of some commonly used economic development and political risk indicator 
variables. A more in depth regression methodology could be developed to build off of 
results found here. Instead of focusing on CBRN terrorism venues, one could employ 
regression methodology to look at the origins of CBRN terrorism. Target types and 
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casualty counts could also be examined, yet due to limited data on CBRN events this 
could be difficult.  
 As mentioned above, improving the simulated annealing cooling schedule and 
performing numerous trials is an area of opportunity. The objective function used to score 
the simulated configuration could be modified to examine additional statistical properties 
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